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Abstract
Proofs of coherence in category theory, starting from Mac Lane’s original
proof of coherence for monoidal categories, are sometimes based on conflu-
ence techniques analogous to what one finds in the lambda calculus, or in
term-rewriting systems in general. This applies to coherence results that
assert that a category is a preorder, i.e. that “all diagrams commute”.
This note is about this analogy, paying particular attention to cases where
the category for which coherence is proved is not a groupoid.
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1 Introduction
This note is about a connection between the categorial notion of coherence and
the notion of confluence found in term-rewriting systems. By coherence we
understand the following:
Coherence is a completeness result for an axiomatization of a brand
of category, usually with respect to a particular category as a model.
In cases when one expects from coherence to decide whether two terms stand
for the same arrow, the model category should be manageable in the sense that
there is a decision procedure, preferably elementary, for equality of arrows in it.
By varying the model category, we can cover with the notion above the results
of Mac Lane and Kelly concerning coherence of monoidal, symmetric monoidal
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and symmetric monoidal closed categories (see [14], [15] and [10]), as well as
many other coherence results (see [5] and [6]).
This notion of coherence is made more precise by taking in the particular
brand of category that interests us a category K freely generated by a set of
objects (this set may be understood as a discrete category). This free category
will always exist if our axiomatization is purely equational. Then coherence
amounts to showing the following:
There is a faithful functor G from the free category K to a particular
model category M.
In logical terms, the existence of the functor G from K to M is soundness, and
the faithfulness of G is completeness proper.
Proofs of coherence in category theory, starting from Mac Lane’s original
proof of coherence for monoidal categories of [14], are sometimes based on con-
fluence techniques analogous to what one finds in the lambda calculus, or in
term-rewriting systems in general. This applies to coherence results that assert
that a category is a preorder, i.e. that “all diagrams commute”. (A preordering
relation is a reflexive and transitive relation; a category that is a preorder is a
preordering relation on the set of its objects.) To make such coherence results
accord with the notion of coherence above, in many cases one can take that
the image of K in M is a discrete category. In this note we will make some
comments on the analogy between proofs of coherence and proofs of confluence,
paying particular attention to cases where the category for which coherence is
proved is not a groupoid.
2 Coherence and proof theory
If one envisages a deductive system as a graph whose nodes are formulae:
A ∧ A
⊤
A
C ∧ (C → A)
✲ ✲
✲
❄
✻
❄❄◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗❦
✛ ✛
❄ ❄
✔
✕✖✻
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and whose arrows are derivations from the sources understood as premises to
the targets understood as conclusions, then equality of derivations usually trans-
forms this deductive system into a category of a particular brand. This category
has a structure induced by the connectives of the deductive system. Although
equality of derivation is dictated by logical concerns, usually the categories we
end up with are of a kind that categorists have already introduced for their
own reason. The prime example here is given by the deductive system for
the conjunction-implication fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic. Af-
ter derivations in this deductive system are equated according to ideas about
normalization of derivations that stem from Gentzen, one obtains the cartesian
closed category K freely generated by a set of propositional variables.
Equality of proofs in intuitionistic logic has not led up to now to a coherence
result—a coherence theorem is not forthcoming for cartesian closed categories.
If we take that the model category M is a category whose arrows are graphs
like the graphs of [10], then we do not have a faithful functor G from the free
cartesian closed category K to M.
If ηp,q is the canonical arrow from q to p→ (p× q), where A→ B stands for
BA, and wA is the diagonal arrow from A to A×A, then G(wp→(p×q) ◦ ηp,q):
( p → ( p × q ) ) × ( p → ( p × q ) )
q
✓ ✏✬ ✩✓ ✏✛ ✘
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
❧
❧
❧
❧
❧
❧
which is obtained from
( p → ( p × q ) ) × ( p → ( p × q ) )
p → ( p × q )
q
❆
❆
✓ ✏
✟✟✟✟
✟✟✟✟
✟✟✟✟
PPPPPP
PPPPPP
PPPPPP
G(wp→(p×q))
G(ηp,q)
is different from G((ηp,q × ηp,q) ◦wq):
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( p → ( p × q ) ) × ( p → ( p × q ) )
q
✓ ✏ ✓ ✏
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
❧
❧
❧
❧
❧
❧
which is obtained from
( p → ( p × q ) ) × ( p → ( p × q ) )
q × q
q
✪
✪
❅
❅
✓ ✏ ✓ ✏✪
✪
❝
❝❝
G(ηp,q × ηp,q)
G(wq)
So, if w is a natural transformation, then G is not a functor.
Dually, if εp,q is the canonical arrow from p× (p→ q) to q, and k
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A,B is the
first projection from A×B to A, then G(k1r,q ◦ (1r × εp,q)):
r
r × ( p × ( p → q ) )
❡
❡
❡
❡
❡ ✒ ✑
which is obtained from
r
r × q
r × ( p × ( p → q ) )
❡
❡
❡
❡
✪
✪✒ ✑
G(k1r,q)
G(1r × εp,q)
is different from G(k1r,p×(p→q)):
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rr × ( p × ( p → q ) )
❡
❡
❡
❡
❡
So, if k1 is a natural transformation, then G is not a functor. The faithfulness of
G fails because of a counterexample in [19]. This does not exclude that with a
more sophisticated model categoryM we might still be able to obtain coherence
for cartesian closed categories (for an attempt along these lines see [17]).
Equality of proofs in classical logic may, however, lead to coherence with
respect to model categories that catch up to a point the idea of generality of
proofs. Such is in particular the category Rel, whose arrows are relations be-
tween finite ordinals, i.e. relations between occurrences of the same propositional
letters in the premises and conclusions. The idea that generality of proofs may
serve as a criterion for identity of proofs stems from Lambek’s pioneering papers
in categorial proof theory of the late 1960s (see [11] for references). This cri-
terion says, roughly, that two derivations represent the same proof when their
generalizations with respect to diversification of variables (without changing the
rules of inference) produce derivations with the same source and target, up to
a renaming of variables.
It is shown in [5] that coherence with respect to the model category Rel could
justify plausibly equality of derivations in various systems of propositional logic,
including classical propositional logic. The goal of that book was to explore
the limits of coherence with respect to the model category Rel. This does not
exclude that other coherence results may involve other model categories, and, in
particular, with a model category different from Rel, classical propositional logic
may induce a different notion of Boolean category than the one introduced in
Chapter 14 of [5]. That notion of Boolean category was not motivated a priori,
but was dictated by coherence with respect to Rel. The definition of that notion
was however not given via coherence, but via an equational axiomatization. We
take such definitions as being proper axiomatic definitions.
We could easily define nonaxiomatically a notion of Boolean category with
respect to graphs of the Kelly-Mac Lane kind (see [10]). Equality of graphs
would dictate what arrows are equal. In this notion, conjunction would not be
a product, because the diagonal arrows and the projections would not make
natural transformations (see above), and, analogously, disjunction would not be
a coproduct (cf. [5], Section 14.3.) The resulting notion of Boolean category
would not be trivial—the freely generated categories of that kind would not
be preorders—, but its nonaxiomatic definition would be trivial. There might
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exist a nontrivial equational axiomatic definition of this notion. Finding such a
definition is an open problem.
We are looking for nontrivial axiomatic definitions because such definitions
give information about the combinatorial building blocks of our notions, as
Reidemeister moves give information about the combinatorial building blocks
of knot equivalence (see [3], Chapter 1). Our axiomatic equational definition of
Boolean category in [5] is of the nontrivial, combinatorially informative, kind.
Coherence of these Boolean categories with respect to Rel is a theorem, whose
proof in [5] requires considerable effort.
Another analogous example is provided by the notion of monoidal category,
which was introduced in a not entirely axiomatic way, via coherence, by Be´nabou
in [1], and in the axiomatic way, such as we favour, by Mac Lane in [14]. For
Be´nabou, coherence is built into the definition, and for Mac Lane it is a theorem.
One could analogously define the theorems of classical propositional logic as
being the tautologies (this is done, for example, in [4], Sections 1.2-3), in which
case completeness would not be a theorem, but would be built into the definition.
3 All diagrams commute
The simplest case of coherence is when it asserts that “all diagrams commute”,
which means that the free category K is a preorder, i.e. a preordering relation
on its objects. In this case, some techniques used for proving coherence are
related to those developed in connection with term-rewriting systems (cf. [7]
and [9]). The difference is that with coherence we are not interested in proving
that starting from an object all paths, i.e. all sequences, of arrows (reductions)
obtained by composing terminate in the same normal form. (This may obtain
sometimes, but is not essential.) Instead, we are interested in proving that the
equality of such paths follows from some basic equations assumed for arrows.
So, the level of our interest is not the same. (This is why we need not go so
high as [9] in the n-categorial hierarchy.)
Reductions here differ also from reductions in the lambda calculus, where
the lambda terms, which correspond to our arrows, are reduced. We do not
reduce arrows, but their types.
If all the arrows in question are isomorphisms, then proving that all paths
of arrows from the same source to the same target:
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BA
❍❍❍❍❍❥
❅
❅❅❘ ❄
 
  ✠
✟✟✟✟✟✙
·
··
·
··
·
··
·
··
·
··
❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
✟✟✟✟✟✙
 
  ✠ ❄
❅
❅❅❘
❍❍❍❍❍❥
are equal amounts to proving that the space between all these paths could
be filled in by a complex of commutative diagrams homeomorphic to an n-
dimensional sphere. Such is, for example, the following complex, called the
associahedron, or Stasheff polytope:
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
❙
❙
❙
❙
✓
✓✓
❙
❙❙
✓
✓
✓
✓
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✓
✓
✓
✓
❙
❙
❙
❙
❙
✓
✓
❙
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗❙
❙❙
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✓
✓✓
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
whose vertices are all five-letter terms made with one binary operation, and
whose edges correspond to single applications of the associativity law. Then
the equality of two paths follows from the fact that they are homotopic in the
complex. This is the global approach to coherence, which stems from [18] (see
also Stasheff’s papers in [13], and references therein).
There is also a local approach to coherence, which stems form [14]. In the
term-rewriting terminology, we have to prove that for any two paths of arrows
that terminate in the same normal form:
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Bnf
A
❍❍❍❍❍❥
✟✟✟✟✟✙
·
··
·
··
❄ ❄
✟✟✟✟✟✙
❍❍❍❍❍❥
one can tile the space in between by commuting diagrams of arrows (reductions).
For this tiling we proceed inductively in the following manner (see [8], Lemma
4.3, where the assumption that we deal with isomorphisms is replaced by the
weaker assumption that we deal with monomorphisms; cf. also [5], Section 4.3):
Bnf
A
C
❍❍❍❍❍❥
✟✟✟✟✟✙
··
·
··
·
·
··
❄ ❄
❄
✟✟✟✟✟✙
❍❍❍❍❍❥
✟✟✟✟✟✙✟✙
❍❍❍❍❍❥❍❥
At this place, we are faced with all the difficulties that appear in proofs of the
Church-Rosser property for a notion of reduction, which consist in listing all the
critical pairs of reductions. The difference with what we have in term-rewriting
systems is that we must always verify that our tiles are commuting diagrams
of arrows. In term-rewriting systems we usually do not deal with that (but cf.
[16], and references therein; the procedure sketched above works when all the
paths starting from the same vertex are bounded in length).
It is not however true that all the interesting cases of coherence where “all
diagrams commute” involve only arrows that are isomorphisms (see [12], [8],
Lemma 4.2, and [5], Section 4.2; remark that the four-dimensional associahedron
has 42 vertices). Consider, for example, arrows whose type
A ∧ (B ∨ C) ⊢ (A ∧B) ∨ C
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has something to do both with distributivity and associativity, and which in [5]
are called dissociativity arrows (in the literature, the same principle is also called
weak or linear distribution; see [5], Section 7.1, for references from category
theory, logic and universal algebra). These arrows need not be isomorphisms,
and they are of particular interest because they underlie the cut principle in
multiple-conclusion (plural) sequent systems.
If we have such arrows, which are not isomorphisms, then the global approach
to coherence is not open any more, and we have to take the local approach.
When we want to show that two paths of arrows are equal by closing the initial
forking of arrows by a commutative diagram, as in the following picture:
B
A
C
❍❍❍❍❍❥
✟✟✟✟✟✙
··
·
··
·
❄ ❄
✟✟✟✟✟✙
❍❍❍❍❍❥
✟✟✟✟✟✙✟✙
❍❍❍❍❍❥❍❥
we need an efficient criterion for showing that the object C is still “above” the
object B (here B need not to be in normal form); i.e., we need to show that we
have a path of arrows from C to B:
B
A
C
❍❍❍❍❍❥
✟✟✟✟✟✙
··
·
··
·
·
··
❄ ❄
❄
✟✟✟✟✟✙
❍❍❍❍❍❥
✟✟✟✟✟✙✟✙
❍❍❍❍❍❥❍❥
A criterion for the existence of such a path in the case where we have associa-
tivity isomorphisms and dissociativity arrows, which are not isomorphisms, is
spelled out in [5] (Section 7.3, Theoremhood Proposition).
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Coherence in this case could perhaps also be deduced from a very general
theorem of [2] (Theorem 5.2.4), whose proof is only sketched in that paper, with
substantial parts missing. It is not clear whether the proof of [5] (Section 7.3)
was envisaged in [2], and judging by the complexity of particular criteria, as the
one mentioned in the preceding paragraph, this seems unlikely.
In cases where such a criterion is not available, the paths of arrows should
first be normalized, according to some normalization procedure (this is often a
procedure inspired by cut elimination), and then, in order to establish coherence,
one has to compare such normalized arrows (see, for example, [10], [5], Chapters
7-14, and [6]). The normal form of paths of arrows need not be unique.
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